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Presidential Address 
Coming Home 
Risa Palm 
Department of Geography and Office of Academic Affairs, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 
80309 
Abstract. This address argues that human geographers should be eclectic in method 
and open to a variety of data sources but should frame our research so as to integrate 
micro- and macro-level observations. To do this, we must focus on the mutual 
effects of agency and structure. We should under- stand the interactions between 
people and environment as being neither random nor law-given but rather the 
combination of historical circumstance of both long and short duration, confining 
and yet not determining human behavior. This approach has the power to return 
geography to its intellectual home, an openness to the world in all its complexity. 
A case study of the response of Californians to earthquake hazards is used to 
illustrate insights that can be gained by adopting this research strategy. 
Key Words: geographic thought, natural hazards, earthquakes, agency, structure, California. 
 
The occasion of a presidential address permits the AAG president to take on the mantle of 
temporary steward of geography, giving the past president, for a very brief moment, the 
opportunity to comment on the current status of the discipline and to outline guideposts for 
possible change. Following the precedents set by other past presidents, I too would like to share 
with you a few thoughts on what I see as important trends in geographic thought and to put 
before you a research framework that, I believe, can enhance our work. I shall argue that by 
adopting this perspective we can bring geography "home" to its core and to its strength. 
Major Research Perspectives in Human Geography 
Recent research, reported in our annual meetings and in our journals, reflects serious divisions in 
our field: we are divided in our assumptions concerning both the nature of reality and the ways in 
which this reality can be addressed. Although it may not be productive to attempt to classify 
individual research accomplishments into “types,” it is essential that we recognize that whenever 
we adopt a research framework, we also adopt a set of assumptions that circumscribes not only 
the questions we pose but also our acceptance that our questions have been answered. At present, 
the organization of questions and evidence in human geography is summarized by four major 
research frameworks. Most geographic research is encompassed by the first of these frameworks. 
The Search for Order 
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The most widely held research perspective, that which seems to be favored by federal funding 
agencies, is based on an assumption that spatial behavior or the relationships between people 
and their physical environments can be explained by generalizations that, ceteris paribis, hold 
over space and time. Our disciplinary goals are taken to be the discovery of these 
generalizations. The basic premise of this perspective, then, is that there are regularities in the 
world and that it is the duty of any science to try to understand these regularities. These 
assumptions form the basis for research linking distance, direction, or connectivity with 
individual or aggregate behavior, or attempts to describe locational or environmental decision 
making by a set of general principles that are tested through survey research or laboratory 
experimentation. 
Data used in this approach are highly varied. In addition to printed information sources, 
geographers may use structured or open-ended interviews as well as simulated decision-making 
settings. Statements concerning preferences or retrospective accounts may be supplemented with 
data on imputed costs of particular environmental factors or census figures on outcomes 
(Bunting and Guelke 1979). 
The primary modification of this line of work has been the important shift from earlier 
deterministic statements toward generalizations cast in probabilistic terms. Examples are the 
derivation of probability statements or matrices describing migration rates or paths and studies of 
land rents based on generalized utility functions (Clark 1982; Davies and Pickles 1985; 
Timmermans 1984; Anas and Eum 1984). Several geographers (Wilson 1981; Rogerson 1985) 
have considered the issue of bifurcation or chaotic dynamics: the possibility that similar prior 
circumstances may result in drastically different results given only a slight change in the nature 
of the causal element (Prigogine 1985). The “science of complexity,” and its implications for the 
modeling of spatial behavior have also been considered by geographers (Couclelis 1986). 
Although the theoretical implications of bifurcation theory, chaotic dynamics, and complexity 
theory have only begun to be explored, this portion of our field clearly continues to seek 
generalizations that reflect a law-given world. 
A Humanistic Alternative 
A second, smaller corps of geographers agrees that generalizations can be made about human 
behavior based on the study of overall patterns such as those just described. They add, however, 
that these generalizations may not provide us with answers to the important geographic questions 
we pose. They claim that such studies fail to give attention to the variety of reasons behind 
spatial or environmental choices, the peculiar development of locations, or responses to the 
physical or human-made environment. Even worse, some argue that “scientific geography” may 
be philosophically less legitimate as a mode of inquiry as subjective knowledge or experience is 
all that can be known. They argue, then, that it is important to understand the meaning of place 
or environment to individuals. 
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The type of study these geographers prescribe varies. At one extreme, phenomenological inquiry 
might be recommended-research that might involve interpretation by the researcher of, for 
example, the appreciation of place. This interpretation might be expressed to the reader in more 
orthodox formats, such as lectures and journal articles, but might also appear as poetry or 
artwork (Porteous 1984; Meinig 1983; Tuan 1978). A second perspective introduces the methods 
of participant observation. The geographer, armed with prior expectations concerning possible 
structural relationships, becomes immersed in a given situation and can observe its operation 
with the eyes of both a social scientist and a participant (Ley 1974). Some of the ethnographic 
research done within this frame- work has been criticized for not linking portrayals of 
community life and values with a larger theoretical perspective and particularly for avoiding 
reference to the historical or social context (Jackson 1985). However, this failure is not a 
necessary attribute of ethnography, as has been demonstrated in the successful integration of 
detailed ethnographic work with a theoretical analysis of class and ethnicity (Cohen 1980; 
Jackson and Smith 1984; Smith 1984). 
The humanistic alternative is therefore in itself complex. Some of the work involves individual 
interpretations of the meaning of place. Other work investigates the taken-for-granted world as 
well as an analysis of the individual within the context of ongoing social relation- ships (Duncan 
1978). Here, the geographer may attempt to portray the rationalizations given for the behavior of 
those in this setting with an awareness of the structural realities underlying these rationalizations. 
A Structuralist Alternative 
Some geographers have charged that even such research may not uncover the unacknowledged 
causes of social or spatial organization -- particularly if such causes were not previously known 
to the social scientists and used to generate hypotheses about empirical regularities. For example, 
explanations embedded in class relationships or in the avoidance of certain people on the basis of 
religion, gender, or race do not necessarily come to light in large-scale empirical regularities, in 
the reports of individuals concerning spatial relationships or responses to the environment, or 
even in detailed ethnographies. It can be argued that because people make decisions within 
highly constrained circumstances, good geography must study the nature of these constraints. 
At the simplest level, one might begin to investigate the role of programs, policies, or individuals 
who control access to resources: the managers -- whether these be public or private employees -- 
or those in control of political and economic resources (such as landowners, financiers, large 
corporations) who make decisions that constrain the options of individuals. Research on these 
managers or decision makers may involve studies of the locational/environmental strategies of 
large corporations affecting the distribution of employment opportunities on a local, regional, 
national, or international scale or of the impacts of property developers on the distribution of 
residential opportunities in the city. Significant objections to this tack have been taken by those 
observing that managers are simply carrying out societal processes whose causes lie far outside 
the realm of individual-level decision making (Leonard 1982; Williams 1982). 
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Another perspective claims that structural factors may provide the best source of explanation. In 
this mode of thought at its extreme, spatial patterns or environmental adaptation are derived from 
macro-structures, and most explanation is claimed to be contained in the larger forces of the 
political economy (Peet 1979; Blaut 1974; Duncan and Ley 1982). Under this set of assumptions, 
“good geography” is done when one focuses on those macro-structures or constraints. 
Criticism of structural determinism is based on the question of whether or not the higher 
structures actually have predictive value. In the case of geographers who appeal to characteristics 
of the political economy, it is important to demonstrate that conceptualizations such as “class” 
actually have “emergent properties” of macro-structures (or collectives) that can be shown to 
exist apart from the characteristics of the individuals that comprise the collectives. Harre (1981) 
has argued that to have explanatory rather than simply rhetorical use, a collectivity such as a 
social class must have three characteristics: it must (1) be continuous in time, (2) be distinctive 
and continuous in space (or in a path through space), and (3) have causal powers. On the basis of 
these criteria, he claims that many widely accepted macro-concepts such as social class are only 
rhetorical classifications: 
Those person-categorizing relations that we do find actually effective in social life 
are constitutive of modest collectives of the order of firms, families and the like ... 
there seem to be no person-constitutive relations which are of greater scale than can 
be found in institutions of the middle range (Harre 1981, 147). 
Thus, according to Harre, although social class is a useful rhetorical construction, it does not 
have the necessary structural components for existence in other categories and certainly does not 
provide causal explanation. This is, of course, a contentious argument, and I put it forward to 
indicate the type of criticism lodged at the ontological nature of the structural determinist 
perspective in geography. 
The Linkage of Micro- and Macro- Structures 
Recent work in sociological theory has focused on the related subject of attempting to forge 
linkages between theory developed at a macro-level and that fitting micro-level observations 
(Stryker 1985). Aaron Cicourel (1981) has argued that social facts (macro-facts) emerge from the 
routine practices of everyday life. As these facts become normalized and made context-free, they 
become macro-structures. It is this process of routinizing micro-level occurrences through 
individual behavior that micro- events are transformed into organizational and interactive 
procedures, further structuring individual behavior. It follows from this line of argument that in 
order to integrate micro- and macro- social phenomena, it is necessary to identify the processes 
that contribute to the creation and evolution of macro-structures and to show that these processes 
are actually embedded in routine inferences. These observations are important for the 
development of geographic theory and can be translated either into studies of the development of 
spatial organization and its structuring process or into studies of the relationships between human 
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settlement and environment and the changing relationships and constraints therein. 
Following this line of argument, another sociologist, Randall Collins (1981) has suggested that 
micro-level studies should be used as a basis for grounding macro-level theory. Alone, micro-
level studies can be seen as reductionist and idealistic in the sense that they ignore the large 
contexts within which experiences and transactions take place, whereas macro-level theory can 
be seen as unexplicated gloss, not relevant to the world as experienced by the individual, or the 
result of an emphasis on bureaucratic approaches to data collection and analysis. The solution is 
the weaving together of the two levels of analysis: 
 
No macro-analysis is a strong argument until it can show not only that a particular 
historical pattern exists, but why that particular pattern exists rather than another. 
The requisite cases to compare may not be available on that macro-level, but 
systematic theory linking micro and macro can provide empirical substitutes as a 
repository of principles whose plausibility has been more strongly demonstrated in 
other, smaller contexts (Collins 1981, 94). 
 
Collins also suggests that new substantive hypotheses may be generated from the micro- 
translation of macro-level concepts. As an example applicable in geography, linkages should be 
drawn between (1) the individual-level studies of migration and mobility motivations and (2) the 
large-scale modeling of mobility rates and paths that are supposedly explained by changes in 
regional economies or movement through the life cycle but which frequently yield “surprising” 
and unexplained empirical patterns. 
Geographers who are proponents of this fourth perspective suggest that explanation need not and 
indeed cannot be general over places and times. They recommend that geographic research 
should be focused on answering questions concerning why a particular society has developed a 
spatial organization or response to environment that it has at a particular time (Johnston 1980b; 
Massey 1984; Pred 1986). Their research attempts to interweave the impacts of significant and 
influential individuals or agents with the existing environmental matrix or structure. The goal 
here is to investigate general processes but not to treat them as deterministic: to recognize that 
specific historic or geographic circumstances modify the effects of general processes, creating 
unique outcomes despite the workings of what can be identified as structural circumstances 
(Massey 1984). It is this perspective within geography that comes closest to trends in European 
social theory that attempt to take a contingent and holistic approach to explanation. In sociology, 
this framework is represented by work on "structuring" (Abrams 1982) and “structuration” 
(Giddens 1984) in which the interaction of the individual agent with the societal structure is the 
focus of study. In history, the French Annales school and especially the work of Fernand Braudel 
represents this form of explanation, where the goal is a description of "real life" or holistic 
understanding of the intersection of daily life and the structure of the larger society, each of 
which exist in time dimensions of various lengths (Braude; 1980, 1984). 
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But Shouldn't We Be Eclectic? 
 
In short, there are at least four competing perspectives on geographic research, each with 
dedicated proponents. Some among us have claimed that it is obvious that “good research” 
should not limit itself to just one of these perspectives. They argue that research should attempt 
to combine these perspectives: that there are “many ways” of human geography and that the 
world is too complex to be understood from any single perspective (Couclelis and Golledge 
1983, 337; Casetti 1985). 
I do not agree with such a call for an unselective synthesis. Of course, it is true that to do the best 
work in human geography, we must be versatile in method and open to a wide range of empirical 
facts. We cannot, should not, and usually do not proscribe the use of particular techniques or 
sources of information about the way the world functions. We must be open to defining problems 
in such a way as to admit the use of as much empirical material as possible and to use whatever 
analytical techniques are appropriate. 
What is not possible, however, is the combination of a philosophy that assumes constancy in the 
social world and deterministic laws with one that assumes an ever-changing reality and admits 
that people are always changing, learning, and readjusting themselves and their worlds. A 
deterministic world and a contingent or probabilistic world are not the same; those that assume 
one cannot in the same breath include the other. Therefore, while we must be open to inquiry 
conducted at various scales and to the use of whatever methods may be appropriate to answer a 
wide range of questions, we must also never confuse such necessary and healthy receptivity to 
information and method with a chaotic and directionless eclecticism in theory (Harris 1980; 
Johnston 1980a; Kirby 1986; Walker 1979; Sayer 1982). 
We shall come to a more complete understanding of place if, while being eclectic in methods, we 
aim our research at understanding the everyday experience of individuals within the web of 
circumstance at a particular time and place, integrating micro-level and macro-level 
observations, theory and conceptualizations. We must recognize the reality of a contingent and 
probabilistic world, where particular inter- actions between people and environment in place are 
neither random nor law-given but rather the combination of historical circumstance of both long 
and short duration, confining and yet not determining human behavior. 
I want to note here that what I am arguing is neither new nor radical; instead it harks back to the 
basic strength of geography as a field that seeks synthesis of human action and environ- mental 
structure in order to understand the complexity of place. Such a perspective has the power to use 
the best of our research to illuminate some very complex questions that we seek to answer. In 
that sense, it can return us to our home-our strength as a discipline. 
Whenever we leave home, and then return, neither we nor our homes are quite the same. 
Similarly this return home is not a simple reversion to tradition nor a denial of the very real 
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progress our discipline has made over the past 30 years. Instead, it is a return home in the sense 
that Bruner (1960) suggested when describing a school curriculum that repeats subject matter at 
ever more complex levels: a movement along an ever-ascending cycle of understanding where 
each time we re-approach a problem we do so with greater depth and insight. I would argue that 
the theory I am advocating has the appearance of a return to the basics of our discipline but at the 
same time includes an enhanced understanding of general principles and constraints. 
In the next portion of the paper, I would like to try to illustrate the insights that can be obtained 
from the perspective of a holistic and contingent approach, one that recognizes the centrality of 
structure and also pays attention to human agency. I shall apply this perspective to the question 
of human adjustment to earthquake hazards in California. I am addressing this question from the 
viewpoint of a human geographer and therefore will focus on how settlement has been 
affected by earthquake hazards. 
The California Earthquake Hazard 
The reasons for my curiosity about this problem are twofold: first, such a study is a classic 
geographic topic about which there has been considerable academic interest; second, the better 
we understand the process of adjustment and areas of maladjustment, the better we can effect 
changes that might actually help California residents as well as business and industry in 
California and other areas linked to its fate. In other words, this type of study has significant 
policy implications: its results can be used to evaluate current legislation or to set the direction 
for future legislation. 
What is the human adjustment to earthquake hazards in California? To answer this question, I 
shall divide the discussion into two parts. The first focuses on the current relationship between 
society and the physical environment. In the second, I present some thoughts on how our 
understanding of human adjustment to earth- quake hazards is informed by a contingent 
perspective integrating micro- and macro-level observations. 
The Present Situation 
As we are well aware, the earthquake hazard in the United States is not limited to California: 
indeed 70 million people in 39 states are susceptible to loss of life and property from seismic- 
related events. However, because of the nature of population concentration and the frequency 
distribution, California has the highest estimated average liability losses, accounting for about 
two-thirds of the U.S. annualized losses (Federal Emergency Management Agency 1983). 
Even within California, risk is far from evenly distributed. It is a function of four factors: (1) the 
location of the faults and the frequency and intensity of movement along them; (2) the nature of 
the soil and substructure on which construction has taken place; (3) the nature of land use 
permitted in particular areas; and (4) the type of construction prevalent in the area and permitted 
by building codes. 
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The distribution of risk is at least partly known. Maps of active faults, micro-zonation maps 
combining knowledge about likely movement on the faults and the distribution of soils and 
bedrock, and maps of buildings and vital facilities susceptible to damage are widely available. 
Residents, government agencies, and industry could respond by avoiding particularly susceptible 
areas, purchasing earthquake insurance, preparing for emergencies, or making structural 
modifications to existing buildings. These are the measures they could undertake. What do they 
actually do? The short answer is that the response varies, and the reasons for this variation are 
only imperfectly understood. Let us consider the response of three sectors: industry and business, 
residents, and government. 
The Response of Industry and Business 
Industry and business have responded to the earthquake hazard in several ways including (1) 
developing emergency plans for the evacuation of employees if an earthquake warning is issued; 
(2) duplicating and storing computerized records outside the local area to use in the event of a 
major damaging earthquake; (3) financial contingency planning, and (4) locating head offices to 
avoid areas susceptible to major damage. How- ever, such commitment is exceptional: large 
numbers of individual businesses and industries have taken virtually no measures either to 
protect their employees from death or injury in the event of a major damaging earthquake or to 
protect their records from being destroyed and their operations from being interrupted. 
Three factors seem to affect the decision of businesses and industries to pay attention to the 
earthquake hazard. First, management must be convinced that a damaging earthquake is likely, 
that their own operations are susceptible to damage, that normal liability insurance will not be 
adequate to cover loss claims, and that the benefits of preparing for an earthquake exceed the 
costs (Prud'homme 1983). 
Second, rules of regulatory agencies and tax laws affect response. For example, do regulatory 
agencies require a particular level of insurance? Is hazard insurance subsidized or a tax- 
deductible business expense? Do corporate executives believe that government-subsidized loans 
or grants for recovery will be available, reducing the need for self-insurance? 
A third significant factor is the administrative structure of the corporation. For example, if a 
corporation has designated one of its managers as responsible for emergency planning and if that 
individual has high career ambitions, then plans are more likely to be developed and some 
response undertaken. Such individual managers have made a major difference in encouraging the 
active response of corporations such as IBM or ARCO, in contrast to the virtual nonresponse of 
other similar California-based corporations. In these instances, it is obvious that corporate 
response could not have been predicted simply through statements about the ''imperatives of 
capital" or the role of the corporation in the political economy. Instead, the individual or agent 
has had a major impact on corporate behavior. 
This description suggests the need for an explanation that is complex and sensitive to nuances 
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not obvious from simple structural descriptions or overly generalized principles. It must be 
informed by explicit attention to the underlying political-economic structure but also must pay 
attention to the impacts of individuals on this structure. We need data on the vulnerability of a 
corporation to economic or physical losses in the event of a major damaging earthquake; but we 
also need to know the perceptions of managers and decision makers, the ways they assess the 
earthquake hazard in light of other daily pressures, or, alternatively, the ways in which individual 
managers believe they can use a cause such as earthquake hazards response to advance their 
careers within the corporation. 
The Response of Residents 
I have approached this topic by focusing on the housing market. Here again, there is a great deal 
of variability in response to earthquake hazards, but again an overall absence of effective 
response. 
The real estate industry has incorporated information on surface fault rupture into the sales 
process, as is mandated by state law, but the disclosure of the location of these zones has had 
virtually no impact on sales (Palm 1981). Homebuyers themselves vary in awareness of hazards 
zones, and those most concerned are also more likely to have formed community support groups, 
stored food and water, purchased earthquake insurance, and generally prepared their families for 
the emergency period that would follow a major earthquake (Palm 1981, 1983). Such households 
are exceptional, however: most Californians give attention to other, more pressing matters in 
their daily lives. 
We can only begin to explain this variability in response if we consider the daily lives of 
Californians in the context of the economic and social structures within which they live. To do 
so, we must use a wide variety of data sources and also make use of a research perspective that 
encourages the synthesis of these data. 
First, there is evidence that past experience with the hazard has an impact on behavior, although 
not necessarily in a straightforward way. Indeed, experience with minor tremors may inoculate 
individuals against accepting the notion that more serious earthquakes will be many times more 
dangerous to life and destructive to property. 
Second, it is important to consider the norms within our culture concerning risk taking and risk 
sharing. For example, societies may vary in the extent to which members believe they can 
control or manage the physical environment, resulting in very different responses to environ- 
mental hazards. In addition, responses to hazards may vary according to tendencies (1) to act 
collectively to reduce losses as opposed to leaving the burden of responsibility on the family unit 
or (2) to accept the authority of a governing body to effect major land use changes impinging on 
private property in order to reduce susceptibility to hazard. 
There are also variations in the time frames people use for planning. Some plan only for the short 
10 
 
run-a few months or a few years- whereas others might more easily plan for a 20 to 50-year time 
span. During the period of rapid house price inflation in the late 1970s, when homeowners were 
almost speculating on their own homes-buying them with plans to sell in the very short term for 
a large profit- planning for the longer term was simply outside the realm of consideration. Since 
homeowners were planning to keep the properties for only a few years, the 20-year period within 
which earthquakes were predicted was simply irrelevant. More recently, with greater stability in 
prices, more attention may be paid to these longer time frames, and environmental hazards may 
increase in salience. 
A third source of variability is the amount of money both at risk and also available to invest in 
mitigation measures. This factor accounts for some of the difference between intended and actual 
response, but again it alone does not predict response. 
A fourth factor that affects response devolves from the findings of psychologists and economists 
studying individual calculation of risk. Laboratory research with economic games and 
psychological testing has revealed fairly systematic sources of error in risk calculation that have 
been termed heuristics. Examples of these are (1) the “gambler's fallacy”-the belief that if a low-
probability event has recently occurred, it is unlikely to occur again soon and therefore can be 
treated as a zero-probability event and (2) the “minimum probability threshold”-- the treatment 
of probabilities below some minimum threshold as if they were zero (Slovic, Kunreuther, and 
White 1974; Kunreuther et al. 1978). Such errors in the calculation of risk also affect response to 
hazards. 
From this cursory listing of some of the many sources of variability in response to hazards, we 
can see that there are many influences on response and that these influences may work in 
confounding and mutually incongruent ways. However, two themes stand out. First, we must 
know as much as possible about the political-economic context within which response takes 
place, as well as known aspects of cultural regularities or psychological traits that routinely 
affect decision making within a given set of constraints. Second, we must investigate the role of 
individuals or agents within this setting. Knowledge about the overall political economy provides 
a general guideline to predict response, but the influence of individuals within that structure is 
also significant. 
 
Government Response 
The third sector to be considered here is government. Here again, one notes a complex 
interweaving of political economic structure and individual action affecting response. 
In California a series of legislative acts and court decisions have increasingly regulated the range 
of response to earthquake hazards. The context for this legislation is the shared assumption that 
earthquake damage is a threat to the general welfare of the population and that legislation should 
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be developed to protect the general welfare and to support, but not to interfere with, the general 
interests of capital. Public concern following damage and death associated with major 
earthquake occurrence can be interpreted in this context and the resulting increasingly restrictive 
legislation understood. The laissez-faire market context also helps explain the fact that during 
periods of little seismic activity, when legislation returns to “business as usual” supporting the 
activities of capital, there is a tendency toward nonenforcement of previous legislation and 
indifference to new legislation. 
Let us briefly review some of the key legislation and court interpretations that have shaped the 
response to earthquake hazards in California. The first evidence of official state involvement in 
earthquake hazards was the reprinting of the eighth annual report of the state mineralogist in 
1888, which described the Owens Valley earthquake of 1872 (Joint Committee on Seismic 
Safety 1974). 
Following the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, the governor appointed a state earthquake 
investigation commission which published a two-volume report and atlas of the earthquake. 
After the Long Beach earthquake of 1933, the state legislature passed the Field Act, which 
required, among other items, that the State Office of Architecture and Construction set up rules 
and regulations concerning earthquake safety in the design and construction of school buildings. 
Other building code provisions (including the Riley Act and the Uniform Building Code) were 
passed and upgraded by the state, counties, and municipalities. 
The Joint Committee on Seismic Safety was established in 1969 to compile information on 
structural engineering, geological and seismological conditions, land use planning, disaster 
preparedness, and the organization of government to cope with disaster. A flurry of activity 
followed the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, including (1) the requirement that all general plans 
contain a seismic safety element including identification and appraisal of seismic hazards, (2) a 
bill requiring geological investigation of prospective sites for new schools and additions to 
existing schools, (3) a requirement that hospital construction standards assure adequate 
earthquake damage resistance, (4) the preparation of inundation maps by owners of dams, (5) a 
requirement that the State Mining and Geology Board delineate and map zones encompassing 
potentially or recently active traces of enumerated faults susceptible to surface faulting or fault 
creep, and (6) a requirement that real estate agents disclose such zones to prospective property 
buyers. 
Finally, since the Coalinga earthquake of 1984, two laws of interest have been passed. The first 
requires insurance companies to offer residential property policy holders the opportunity to buy 
earthquake insurance; the second sets up a prototype earthquake prediction system, including a 
comprehensive emergency response plan for the Parkfield section of the San Andreas Fault, an 
area where a magnitude 5.5-6.0 earthquake is predicted to occur within four years of January 
1988. 
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Most of this legislation was developed in response to immediate crises, such as earthquakes 
resulting in large-scale destruction of property and loss of life. But it was also passed because of 
the long-term efforts of key individuals. In the case of some of the legislation reviewed here, key 
actors were state legislators representing districts particularly affected by earthquake hazards or 
with long-standing interests in seismic safety. Others were scientists who became involved in 
state public policy formulation. Still others were business executives who had acquired interest 
in seismic safety either through state-sponsored seminars or through direct previous experience 
with earth- quakes, e.g., bankers who had lost money after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake 
through mortgage loan defaulting. Finally, the insurance and real estate lobbies in California 
have also been involved in modifying legislation. For example, the real estate lobby supported 
the change of the name of “geologic hazards zones” to “special studies zones.” 
Although the impacts of each of these pieces of legislation could be analyzed, suffice it to say 
that the legislation has had a mixed record with respect to the general promotion of public 
welfare. The Special Studies Zone Act should have had an impact on the developers' decisions to 
locate large-scale projects of four units or more in the zones, because it mandates a geologic 
report for each such project. However, developers have reported that although they may have 
made some small concessions to the required geologic reports in designing the configuration of 
large-scale housing projects, they have not suffered economic losses because of the legislation. 
They even report having transferred some public functions, such as pipelines or roads, to the 
areas along the fault traces where residential development was proscribed by the law, thereby 
transferring costs from the private to the public sector (Palm 1985). 
Similarly, the recent requirement that insurance companies make an explicit offer of earthquake 
insurance will doubtless benefit of the insurance companies themselves, as a provision in the 
legislation holds them harmless from further claims of concurrent causation (when two or more 
causes combine to produce a loss), previously a source of great potential liability to the insurers. 
In short, some of the legislation seemed to deal with providing for the general safety and well-
being of society by strengthening building code requirements for schools, hospitals, and other 
public facilities, and mandating seismic safety planning. However, it has generally not interfered 
with the economic livelihood of those industries benefiting from the development, sale, or 
insurance of residential property and in some cases has provided legal assurances to these 
concerns. Some of the legislation has served to circumscribe the human occupance of land 
susceptible to natural hazards but has usually been effective primarily within those confines that 
could be anticipated based on an understanding of the interests of capital. 
Knowledge of the impact of key individuals or "agents" on legislation and the subsequent 
structure has even been incorporated into policy. Social scientists, with full understanding of the 
significance of the involvement of influential individuals in the passage and implementation of 
legislation, supported the establishment of agencies such as SCEPP (the Southern California 
Earthquake Preparedness Project) and BAREPP (the Bay Area Regional Earthquake 
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Preparedness Project). Both are cooperative agencies sponsored by the state but involving active 
collaboration of local business and industry in planning for earthquake recovery and response as 
well as establishing plans to mitigate against some of the preventable losses. The existence of 
such agencies, and particularly the self-conscious involvement of social scientists in their 
establishment and nourishment, is a prime example of what Giddens has termed "reflexive 
monitoring of action" (Giddens 1979, 56). 
This interpretation has been cast as an interplay of the physical setting, the political-economic 
context, and the not-entirely-predictable influence of “agents.” This framework can also be used 
to integrate the significance of changes in the economy that encourage greater or lesser attention 
to the physical environment and changes in the composition of the population with possibly 
different degrees of experience in coping with earthquake hazards. 
To understand the actual response of real people in a real place, we do best to cast our research in 
a framework that explicitly examines (1) constraints in the physical environment, (2) the 
historical setting, including the nature of the political economy, (3) decision-making processes 
and norms embedded in cultural assumptions, (4) psychological factors affecting general 
decision making within this culture, and (5) the ambitions and influence of individuals acting in 
the web of historical and geographic circumstances within which they live their lives. The 
framework I have put before you does just this and therefore not only permits the inclusion of 
these highly varied factors but also encourages examination of their complex patterns of inter- 
action. A geography that would ignore any of these elements would be not only poorer but also 
less powerful in providing answers to the research questions we pose. 
And Now a Few Last Words 
The initial question I posed was: what is the human adjustment to earthquake hazards? I have 
argued that the question is best answered if we approach the research problem as a search for an 
understanding of a relationship between people and environment that is linked to the web of life 
of individuals and collectivities in a given place. This web is affected by its own history and 
setting but is also susceptible to influence by individuals within it. We must recognize that 
individuals and structures, psychological states and political-economic contexts, power settings 
and individual choices-all have an influence in a complex world. The recognition of this 
principle is especially important if one wishes to understand not only the observable responses 
but also the extent to which there is nonresponse of both individuals and institutions or an 
unintended consequence of decisions that affect susceptibility to hazard. To answer our research 
question, then, it is important to be versatile and eclectic in our data gathering and analysis, but 
to be mindful of our time-specific, location-specific context and the mutual lines of influence of 
this setting and the individuals living within it. This attempt at synthesis has always been the 
heart of our discipline. It is our source of strength: our "home base," so to speak. 
I have come back to my childhood home-to Minneapolis-to give this address. But I have come 
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back older and with more experience behind me than I had when I left. In the same way, I am 
making a plea to my fellow geographers to return to our intellectual home, to our openness to the 
world, and to our willingness to entertain a variety of data and methods at the same time, as we 
weave these together to explain place. 
As geographers we are constantly challenged to show that our work is as significant as that of 
other social, behavioral, or physical sciences. One of our responses to this challenge must be the 
demonstration that our work can provide insights into important scientific questions, such as the 
one that is central to our field: the relationship between societies and the physical environment. 
We shall meet this challenge if we adopt an approach that links our scientific research to the 
broadest possible base of under- standing and to the mainstream of social theory and if we use all 
of the methods and data at our disposal to answer the questions we pose. 
It is important that our discipline not only survive but also prosper, despite the current 
increasingly competitive institutional climate. I am confident that because we are addressing 
questions of great significance to society and humankind and because we are casting these 
questions in such a way as to provide significant insights to understanding our place in the world 
--our very “home” --that we shall prevail. 
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